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Abstract
This paper studies middlemen—or “critical nodes”—that intermediate flows in a di-
rected network. The contestability of a node is introduced as a network topological
concept of competitiveness meaning that an intermediary’s role in the brokering of
flows in the network can be substituted by a group of other nodes. We establish the
equivalence of uncontested intermediaries and middlemen.
The notion of node contestability gives rise to a measure that quantifies the control
exercised by a middleman in a network. We present a comparison of this middleman
centrality measures with relevant, established network centrality measures. Further-
more, we provide concepts and measures expressing the robustness of a middleman as
the number of links or nodes that have to be added to or removed from the network
to nullify the middleman’s power.
We use these concepts to identify and measure middleman power and robustness
in two empirical networks: Krackhardt’s advice network of managers in a large corpo-
ration and the well-known Florentine marriage network as a proxy of power brokerage
between houses in Renaissance Florence.
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1 The critical role of middlemen in networks
Research has recognised networks as important descriptors of social and economic pro-
cesses (Watts 2004, Jackson 2008, Newman 2010, Baraba´si 2016). Node centrality aims
to identify the most influential nodes in the network. This paper investigates those nodes
that are critical for the flow of information and trade in a network. Such critical nodes—or
“middlemen”—have traditionally been considered in undirected networks only.1
Here, we consider these middlemen in the more general context of directed networks.
We introduce a middleman as a node that can block the information flow from at least
one node to another. If one applies this definition to undirected networks, one arrives at
the standard notion of a middleman as a singleton node cut set. In the context of directed
networks this is no longer the case: Its removal does not necessarily break up the whole
network; it just compromises the information flow for at least one pair of nodes in the
network. The brokerage function of middlemen allows them to be highly extractive to
both directly and indirectly connected nodes (Kalai et al. 1978).
Naturally, the existence of middlemen is closely related to the interactive environment
represented by that network. Gilles & Diamantaras (2013) show that middlemen have
the potential to be highly exploitive given a lack of alternative pathways along which to
conduct the required socio-economic interactions. The main conclusion from this research
is a non-trivial extension of how economists and social scientists perceive the architecture
and dynamics of exchange systems, how the presence of a middleman can hold a system
together, and, as a consequence of their position, can act as rent-extracting monopolists
with excessive bargaining power (Easley & Kleinberg 2010, Chapter 11).
We reduce these notions to a general definition of “contestation” in directed networks.
Our notion of contestation refers to a network topological property that indicates whether
interaction can be conducted without the involvement of a certain node. Hence, a node
is contested if alternative pathways are available to establish interaction between pairs of
nodes in the network. Our main result shows that there is a formal duality between the
existence of middlemen and network contestability. In particular, an intermediary node is
a middleman if and only if it is uncontested.
Despite the wide acknowledgement within social network analysis of the significance
of middlemen, centrality measures do not necessarily identify these critical nodes as being
important even though their removal may deteriorate the functionality of the network as
a whole. As the notion of centrality came to the fore, Freeman (1978, p. 219) argued that
central nodes were those “in the thick of things”. To exemplify this, he used an undirected
star network consisting of five nodes. The middle node, at the centre of the star, has three
advantages over the other nodes: It has more ties; it can reach all the others more quickly;
1Middlemen are defined as so-called cut nodes in mathematical graph theory (Wilson 2010). The
importance of these critical nodes as conduits of information flows in social networks has been recognised
by Burt (1992, 2004, 2005) and Burt (2010) and in economic networks by Kalai et al. (1978), Rubinstein
& Wolinsky (1987), Jackson & Wolinsky (1996), Gilles et al. (2006) and Siedlarek (2015).
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and it controls the flow between the others.
Given this sentiment, one would expect that betweenness centrality measures (Freeman
1977) would capture the influence that such middlemen exert. However, we show that this
is not the case. Instead, we propose a new middleman power measure that exhibits the
desired properties. We apply this middleman power measure to study two very well known
(historical) directed networks from the literature. These applications allow us to make
an in-depth comparison with betweenness centrality and eigenvector centrality (Bonacich
1987).
In Krackhardt (1987)’s advice network, our middleman power measure confirms Krack-
hardt’s original assessment of the most influential node. Also, for the Florentine marriage
network of the early Renaissance (Padgett & Ansell 1993, Padgett 1994), we conclude that
our middleman power measure clearly ranks the more powerful middlemen higher than
the less powerful, confirming with the reported historical analysis. Furthermore, we show
that, despite the importance of middlemen in these networks, this positional feature is not
properly and fully identified by conventional centrality measures.
Finally, we consider the robustness of middleman positions in the network in light
of potential changes to the network topology. The more robust a middleman’s position,
the more changes in the network topology are required to reduce the position of that
middleman. Robustness, therefore, refers to a dynamic property of the network topology.
In particular, we look at two fundamentally different measurements of middleman
robustness. First, we consider changes to the arcs and links that are present in the network.
Thus, the robustness of a middleman is the number of arcs that need to be deleted from
or added to the network in order to contest the middleman. Second, we define a node-
based robustness concept that counts the number of nodes that need to be removed from
the network to contest the middleman. We show that these robustness measures are
closely related and that the arc-based measure is sufficient to indicate the robustness of a
middleman.
We apply these robustness measures to the Florentine marriage network and identify
that the Medici house had a less robust position than considered in the literature. In
particular, the Pazzi is shown to have a more robust position, supporting an alternative
explanation of the rivalry between these two houses in renaissance Florence.
Outline. We follow this introduction with Section 2, which discusses the required no-
tions of network science. Section 3 introduces the notions of strong and weak middlemen
and considers the dual notion of network contestability. Section 4 discusses our measure
of middleman power, which assigns a quantitative expression to a node’s brokerage power.
Additionally, the section provides three measures regarding the robustness of middleman
positions in the network. Section 5 investigates two empirical case studies of social net-
works where middlemen have been identified as critical: Krackhardt’s advice network and
the Florentine marriage network. Section 6 concludes.
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2 Network preliminaries
In this paper we focus on networks as representations of relational infrastructures that map
how entities such as individuals and firms communicate and exchange information, money
or goods. These entities are represented by nodes, while relationships are represented by
directed arcs between nodes. Throughout we consider these infrastructures as carriers of
flows of physical commodities in a logistics framework or of information. Middlemen are
identified as those entities that exercise control over the flows in the network.
Definition 2.1. A (directed) network is a pair (N,D) where N = {1, 2, . . . , n} is a
finite set of nodes and D ⊂ {(i, j) | i, j ∈ N and i 6= j} is a set of arcs, being directed
relationships from one node to another.
Throughout, we denote an arc (i, j) ∈ D by ij ∈ D and a directed network (N,D) by D
unless N is ambiguous. We interpret the nodes N in the network as a set of entities that
are connected through the relational infrastructure represented by the arcs in D. Thus,
D describes the infrastructure within which the nodes are embedded. We point out that
D is irreflexive in the sense that (i, i) /∈ D for any i ∈ N .
We assume throughout that the infrastructure represented by D supports flows of
information, money and/or goods between the nodes in N and that the control of these
flows is of critical importance to the functionality of this infrastructure.2
An undirected network is defined as a network (N,D) such that all arcs are recipro-
cated: ij ∈ D if and only if ji ∈ D. An undirected network represents a special case of a
network in that there exist arbitrary flows between any two linked nodes.
Walks and paths. A walk from node i to node j in a network D—or simply an ij-walk
in D—is an ordered list of nodes Ωij(D) = (i1, i2, . . . , im) such that m > 3, i1 = i, im = j
and ikik+1 ∈ D for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,m− 1}. Clearly, a walk is a sequence of adjacent nodes
in the network. Walks might revisit nodes and, therefore, might contain loops.
The notion of a path excludes loops and can be formulated using set-theoretic notions.
Formally, a path from i to j in a network D—or, simply, an ij-path—is a finite subset of
nodes Wij(D) = {i1, . . . , im} ⊂ N with m > 3, i1 = i, im = j and ikik+1 ∈ D for every
k = 1, . . . ,m − 1. Therefore, to every ij-path Wij(D) = {i1, . . . , im} there corresponds a
unique ij-walk given by Ωij(D) = (i1, . . . , im). We remark that since each element in a
set is listed only once, every path is a walk without any loops.
In many cases there are multiple paths from i to j in a network D. If this is required, we
denote W vij(D) as the v-th distinct path from i to j in D. This gives rise to the collection
Wij(D) =
{
W 1ij(D), . . . ,W
V
ij (D)
}
, consisting of all distinct paths Wij(D) from node i to
2We emphasise that we can generalise this setting by assuming that each arc ij ∈ D has a certain
capacity that limits the flow on that arc. In this paper we limit ourselves to the case in which these arcs
have unlimited capacity and there are no bounds on the flows in the network. Hence, either a connection
between two nodes i and j exists or not.
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node j in D, where V is the number of distinct ij-paths in D. Here, Wij(D) = ∅ denotes
that there is no path from node i to node j in the network D, whileWij(D) 6= ∅ indicates
that there exists at least one path from i to j in D.
Connectedness. We now say that node i is connected to node j if Wij(D) 6= ∅, i.e.,
there is at least one path from node i to node j in the network D. A network D is weakly
connected if for all i, j ∈ N either i is connected to j, or j is connected to i, or both.
Two distinct nodes i, j ∈ N are strongly connected in the network D if Wij(D) 6= ∅
as well as Wji(D) 6= ∅, indicating that there is always a path from node i to node j and
back. A network D is strongly connected if Wij 6= ∅ and Wji 6= ∅ for all nodes i, j ∈ N .
Hence, any strongly connected network is always weakly connected. This implies all nodes
are bi-connected in the sense that bilateral flows exists between any two nodes.
A subset of nodes M ⊂ N is a component of D if (M,DM ) with DM = D ∩ (M ×M)
is weakly connected and and there is no node i ∈ N \M outside node set M such that
(M+ i,DM+i) is weakly connected.
3 Clearly, every network contains components. In fact,
a weakly connected network consists of exactly one component, namely D itself. The next
insight states the converse of this property.
Lemma 2.2. A network D on node set N is not weakly connected if and only if it consists
of two or more components.
Similarly, a subset of nodes M ⊂ N is a strong component of D if (M,DM ) with DM =
D ∩ (M ×M) is strongly connected and and there is no node i ∈ N \M outside node set
M such that (M + i,DM+i) is strongly connected. Clearly, every strong component of a
network D is indeed a component of D, but it is not necessarily the case that a component
is a strong component.
Successors and predecessors. Connectedness in a network leads to several auxiliary
concepts. We denote by
si(D) = {j ∈ N | ij ∈ D} (1)
the set of direct successors of node i in network D. Similarly, we denote by
pi(D) = {j ∈ N | ji ∈ D} ≡ {j ∈ N | i ∈ sj(D)} (2)
the set of direct predecessors of node i in network D. We note that nodes h ∈ pi(D)∩si(D)
are the ones that are connected to node i ∈ N by an undirected link. Hence, D is an
undirected network if and only if si(D) = pi(D) for all nodes i ∈ N .
Furthermore, a node j is called a successor of node i in network D if Wij(D) 6= ∅.
Similarly, node i is called a predecessor of node j in network D if j is a successor of j in
3Here we employ that notation that S + t = S ∪ {t} for every set S and t /∈ S.
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D, i.e., Wij(D) 6= ∅. This gives rise to the following two node sets in relation to some
node i ∈ N :
Si(D) = {j ∈ N |Wij(D) 6= ∅} (3)
Pi(D) = {j ∈ N |Wji(D) 6= ∅} (4)
Si is the set of successors of node i in network D, while Pi is the set of predecessors of node
i in network D. We note that i /∈ Si(D) as well as i /∈ Pi(D). Obviously, si(D) ⊂ Si(D)
and pi(D) ⊂ Pi(D). Node k is an indirect successor of i in D if k ∈ Si(D)\ si(D) meaning
that Wik(D) 6= ∅. Thus, i’s successor set Si is composed of all of i’s direct and indirect
successors.
The fact that a node is not a member of its successor and predecessor sets gives rise
to the following two definitions.
Si(D) = Si(D) ∪ {i} (5)
P i(D) = Pi(D) ∪ {i} (6)
We denote by Si(D) the reach of node i in network D, while P i(D) denotes node i’s origin
in network D. These auxiliary concepts are required in later analysis in this paper.
For node i ∈ N its out-degree in D is defined by d+i = #si(D) and its in-degree in D
by d−i = #pi(D). Now, di = #{si(D)∪pi(D)} denotes node i’s (overall) degree in network
D.4 Clearly, di 6 min{d+i + d−i , n− 1}.
The node set N can now be partitioned into four distinct subsets of nodes. The
classification of nodes is based on their connectivity properties, which gives rise to dividing
the nodes into sources, sinks, leaves and intermediaries. This is formalised as follows:
Definition 2.3. Let D be a directed network on node set N and let i ∈ N be some node.
(i) Node i is a source in network D if d−i = 0 and d
+
i > 1. We denote
N+D = {i ∈ N | i is a source in D }.
(ii) Node i ∈ N is a sink in network D if d−i > 1 and d+i = 0. We denote
N−D = {i ∈ N | i is a sink in D }.
(iii) Node i ∈ N is a leaf in network D if d+i = d−i = di = 1, i.e., i is connected to
exactly with one other node through an undirected link. We denote
LD = {i ∈ N | i is a leaf in D }.
4Here, #S denotes the cardinality of the finite set S.
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(iv) Node i ∈ N in an intermediary in network D if di > 2 and d−i > 1 as well as
d+i > 1. We denote
MD = {i ∈ N | i is an intermediary in D } =
= {i ∈ N | There exist j ∈ pi(D) and h ∈ si(D) with j 6= h }.
We remark that the node set is now partitioned into these constructed subsets:
N = N+D ∪N−D ∪ LD ∪MD (7)
where these constituting sets are pairwise disjoint.
Definition 2.4. Let D be a network on node set N . For every intermediary i ∈ MD we
denote by
D − i = DN\{i} = { jh ∈ D | j, h ∈ N \ {i} } . (8)
the reduced network after removing intermediary i from the constituting node set.
Therefore, D−i is the restricted network that results after the removal of the intermediary
i and all arcs to and from node i from the network D.
3 Middlemen and contestability
In this section we introduce the notion of a middleman in a (directed) network and discuss
the notion of contestation as an equivalent, dual conception of these middlemen.
3.1 Defining middlemen
We identify middlemen—or “critical nodes”—as intermediary nodes i ∈MD that have the
ability to broker certain flows in network D. Following the established literature in graph
theory and network analysis, a critical node in an undirected network is equivalent to the
graph theoretical notion of a cut node. Such nodes can severely disrupt and manipulate the
typical operations on a network by disconnecting the network into two or more components
(Kalai et al. 1978, Burt 1992, Jackson & Wolinsky 1996, Gilles et al. 2006). Here, we extend
this concept to arbitrary (directed) networks. In our general context, our conception
focusses on the disruption of the connectivity of two or more nodes.
Definition 3.1. Let D be a network on node set N and let h ∈ MD be an intermediary
in D.
(a) Node h is an ij-middleman in the network D, where i, j ∈ N and i 6= j, if
h ∈ ∩Wij(D) \ {i, j} =
(
W 1ij(D) ∩ . . . ∩W Vij (D)
) \ {i, j} (9)
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where V > 1 is the number of distinct paths from i to j. Now, Mij(D) ≡ ∩Wij(D)\
{i, j} denotes the set of all ij-middlemen in D.
(b) An intermediary h ∈MD is a middleman in network D if there exist two distinct
nodes i, j ∈ N with i 6= j such that h is an ij-middleman in D.
The set of all middlemen in D is therefore given by
M(D) =
⋃
i,j∈N : i 6=j
Mij(D) (10)
A middleman in a network is an intermediary node that is a member of all paths between
at least two other nodes within the given network. Therefore, a middleman controls the
flow between at least two other nodes. Conversely, a non-middleman is an intermediary
that if removed from the network does not affect the connectivity of any two or more other
nodes.
The following properties can be deduced directly from the above definition. We state
most of these assertions without proof.
Proposition 3.2. Let D be a directed network on the node set N = {1, . . . , n}.
(i) If n 6 2, there do not exist any middlemen in D.
(ii) For all i, j ∈ N with j ∈ si(D) it holds that Mij(D) = ∅. This implies that the
complete directed network has no middlemen.
(iii) Every middleman i ∈M(D) has a local clustering co-efficient of less than 1 in the
sense of Baraba´si (2016, Sections 2.10 and 3.9).
(iv) If D is undirected in the sense that ij ∈ D if and only if ji ∈ D, then Mij(D) =
Mji(D) for all i, j ∈ N .
Proof. For (iii), note that, if i ∈ N is a middleman in D, then there exist at least one
j ∈ pi(D) and h ∈ si(D) such that jh /∈ D as well as hj /∈ D. Hence, i, j and h do
not form a triad in the underlying undirected network and, therefore, the local clustering
coefficient of i in D is strictly less than 1.
From (iv) it follows that in an undirected network a node is a middleman if it rests on all
paths from node i to node j. This means that the removal of a middleman disrupts the
communication between nodes j and i. Hence, in an undirected network, a middleman
is indeed a “cut node” or a singleton “cut set” as traditionally understood (Wilson 2010,
§5).
By definition a middleman rests on all paths from node i to node j, but does not
have to rest on all paths from j to i. This implies that the removal of a middleman in
a network disrupts the interaction from i to j, but the interaction from node j to node i
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may be unaffected. Hence, even with the removal of a middleman from a network, nodes i
and j can still remain weakly connected. This implies in particular that the removal of a
middleman might leave the network weakly connected, although not strongly connected.
This insight motivates a further refinement of the notion of a middleman in a directed
network.
Definition 3.3. Let D be a weakly connected network on node set N = {1, . . . , n} with
n > 3.
(i) A middleman h ∈ M(D) is a strong middleman in D if the reduced network
D − h is not weakly connected and consists of two or more components.
(ii) A middleman h ∈M(D) is a (regular) middleman in D if the reduced network
D − h is weakly connected.
Regular middlemen exist in both cyclic and acyclic directed networks. Example 3.4 high-
lights the existence of both weak and strong middlemen in an acyclic network.
1
2
3
4
5
6 7
Figure 1: Acyclic network highlighting weak and strong middlemen
Example 3.4. Consider a weakly connected networkD on the node setN = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7},
which is depicted in Figure 1. This network represents a flow system from the left to the
right. We easily determine that M(D) = {2, 5, 6}, where nodes 2 and 5 are regular mid-
dlemen and node 6 is a strong middleman. In the graphical representation this is indicated
by the shading of these nodes and the circling of node 6.
Consider node 2. Node 2 lies on all paths from node 1 to node 4, therefore 2 ∈ M1,4(D)
and W1,4(D − 2) = ∅. However, the reduced network D − 2 remains weakly connected,
meaning that node 2 must be a regular middleman.
An analogous argument could be made for node 5 because 5 ∈ M3,6(D) ∩M3,7(D) and,
therefore,W3,6(D−5) =W3,7(D−5) = ∅. On the other hand, the reduced network D−5
remains weakly connected.
Finally, 6 ∈ M1,7(D) ∩M2,7(D) ∩M3,7(D) ∩M4,7(D) ∩M5,7(D). Indeed, node 6 is the
sole broker of all interaction with node 7. In particular, the network D − 6 is not weakly
connected and consists of two components: {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and {7}.
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All other intermediaries are non-middlemen. Indeed, even the removal of either node 3 or
4 does not affect the connectivity in the network.5 
Theorem 3.5 below naturally follows from Definition 3.3 and the properties illustrated in
Example 3.4.
Theorem 3.5. Every middleman in a strongly connected network is a strong middleman.
Proof. Consider a strongly connected network (N,D) where #N = n > 3. According to
Definition 3.1, a node h ∈ N is a middleman if it rests on all paths between at least two
other nodes, say i and j. Since Wij(D) = Wji(D), the property that h ∈ ∩Wij(D) implies
that h ∈ ∩Wji(D).
Thus, in D − h all paths from node j to node i as well as from node i to node j are
disconnected. This in turn implies that i and j cannot be connected through any path
in any direction and D − h must contain at least two components, separating i and j in
different components. This implies that h is actually a strong middleman in D.
The fact that every weakly connected undirected network D on node set N is actually
strongly connected gives rise to the following corollary to Theorem 3.5:
Corollary 3.6. Every middleman in an undirected network is a strong middleman.
Regular middlemen only exist due to the distinction between weakly connected and strongly
connected nodes. The distinction collapses in an equivalent undirected network as all nodes
are effectively strongly connected. This implies the following.
Corollary 3.7. Let D be some network on node set N with n > 3. If there exists at least
one regular middleman in D, then there exist two distinct nodes i, j ∈ N with i 6= j such
that Wij(D) 6= ∅ and Wji(D) = ∅.
The distinction between regular and strong middlemen is natural and enhances our un-
derstanding of the functionality of directed versus undirected networks. We enhance this
understanding further in the following discussion that allows the measurement of middle-
man control, in which it is shown that regular middlemen can actually be more powerful
than strong middlemen.
3.2 Contestation of intermediaries in networks
Next we examine the relationship between critical nodes and competition or “contestation”
in networks. Based on the model of network competition in Gilles & Diamantaras (2013),
such contestation rests on the ability to use alternative pathways to reach other nodes in
5It is worth noting that if all arcs were reciprocated in network D from Figure 1 to form an undirected
network, nodes 2 and 5 would no longer be middlemen. However, node 6 would still be a middleman.
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the network and circumvent a particular intermediary. Hence, it refers to the ability to
prevent that intermediary from mediating the information flow to other nodes.
A node is contested by other nodes if this group of nodes can cover all connections
facilitated by that node. Formally, contestation is modelled as the ability of an alternative
group of nodes to service the coverage of an intermediary, given by the product of that
intermediary’s predecessor and successor set.
Definition 3.8. Let D be a network on node set N = {1, . . . , n} and let i ∈MD be some
intermediary node in D.
(a) The coverage of intermediary i in the network D is defined as all node pairs (h, j)
with h 6= j that can use node i as an intermediary in their interaction:
Γi(D) = { (h, j) ∈ Pi(D)× Si(D) | h 6= j } (11)
and the extended coverage of node i in network D is defined by
Γi(D) = P i(D)× Si(D) (12)
(b) Intermediary i is contested by node set C ⊂ N in the network D if i /∈ C and it
holds that
Γi(D) ⊆
⋃
j∈C
Γj(D − i) (13)
The class of all contesting node sets of intermediary i is denoted by Ci(D) ⊂ 2N .
A minimal contesting node set is given by C∗i (D) ∈ arg min{#C | C ∈ Ci(D) }.
(c) Intermediary i is directly contested by a node j 6= i in network D if the singleton
node set {j} contests i in D, i.e., Γi(D) ⊆ Γj(D − i).
(d) Intermediary i is uncontested if there is no node set that contests i.
The next proposition states in essence the very nature of contestation in a network is that
a node can completely take over the functionality of the contested intermediary. Thus,
intermediary i is directly contested by node j only when all of i’s predecessor set can be
connected to i’s successor set either through or from node j when i is removed from the
network.
Proposition 3.9. An intermediary node i ∈ MD is directly contested by node j ∈ N in
network D if and only if
Pi(D) ⊆ Pj(D − i) ∪ {j} as well as Si(D) ⊆ Sj(D − i) ∪ {j} . (14)
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The exact same intuition is used with respect to contestation by a group of nodes as shown
in the next example.
Example 3.10. We consider a network to illustrate the notion of contestability. Consider
directed network D on node set N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7} shown in Figure 1 on page 8. Table
1 below provides the predecessor and successor sets of all nodes in the network.
Node Predecessor Set Successor Set
1 P1(D) = ∅ S1(D) = {2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}
2 P2(D) = {1} S2(D) = {4, 5, 6, 7}
3 P3(D) = {1} S3(D) = {5, 6, 7}
4 P4(D) = {1, 2} S4(D) = {6, 7}
5 P5(D) = {1, 2, 3} S5(D) = {6, 7}
6 P6(D) = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} S6(D) = {7}
7 P7(D) = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} S7(D) = ∅
Table 1: Predecessor and successor sets of nodes in Figure 1
Using this information we deduce that intermediaries 3 and 4 are contested, whereas in-
termediaries 2, 5, and 6 are uncontested.
Here, node 3 is directly contested by node 2: Indeed, P3(D) = {1} ≡ P2(D) and S3(D) =
{5, 6, 7} ⊂ S2(D) = {4, 5, 6, 7}. It is also true that P3(D) ⊆ P2(D − 3) ∪ {2} = {1, 2} and
S3(D) ⊆ S2(D − 3) ∪ {2} = {2, 4, 5, 6, 7}.
This case introduces what can be denoted as asymmetric contestation, meaning that al-
though node i contests node j, it may not be true that node j contests node i. Here, node
3 directly contests node 2, although node 2 is not directly contested by node 3. Only in
rare cases will there exist symmetric contestation where node i contests node j and node
j contests node i. 
The next example highlights more complex forms of contestation where a highly connected
node contests two others, while these two nodes in turn contest the highly connected node.
Example 3.11. Consider directed network D on node set N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}, shown
in Figure 2, where M(D) = ∅. Here, node 4 connects nodes 1 and 2 to nodes 5 and
6, and therefore directly contests node 2 while not being directly contested by any other
individual node. However, node 4 is not a middleman and indeed the set C = {2, 3}
contests node 4.
Clearly, the extended coverage of nodes 2 and 3 encapsulates the coverage of node 4.
Therefore, although nodes 2 and 3 do not contest node 4 individually, the node set C =
{2, 3} contests node 4. Indeed, the condition for group contestation holds:
P4(D)× S4(D) ⊂
(
P 2(D − 4)× S2(D − 4) ∪ P 3(D − 4)× S3(D − 4)
)
. (15)
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Figure 2: Network D in Example 3.11 where C = {2, 3} contests node 4
If node 4 is removed from the network, its function can be fully replaced by the combination
of nodes 2 and 3 and therefore all other nodes that were connected can still be connected
in the same way. 
Example 3.11 highlights the requirement for the extended coverage Γj(D − i) used in the
definition of contestation instead of the coverage, Γj(D− i). Indeed, consider the network
in Figure 2. As noted, there exist no middlemen and all intermediaries are contested given
the definition above. With a more restricted conception based on Γj(D− i), node 4 would
neither be contested nor a middleman. Definition 3.8 adjusts for predecessors of the given
node, i, that can connect to the successors of i, thereby fulfilling the same function and,
thus, contesting i.
Examples 3.10 and 3.11 give an indication that if an intermediary is contested, it
cannot be a middleman. For example, in Figure 1 agent 3 is a non-middleman because
his function is directly contested by the presence of node 2, and node 2 is a middleman
because its function is not contested by any other node in the network. Our main result
states a duality between contestation and the existence of middlemen.
Theorem 3.12. (Duality of middlemen and contestability)
Consider a network D on node set N with n > 3. Then:
(a) Every middleman i ∈M(D) is an uncontested intermediary in D.
(b) If an intermediary i ∈ MD is uncontested in D, then i is a middleman, i.e., i ∈
M(D).
Proof. Let D be a network on node set N with n > 3.
Proof of (a): The condition for contestability stated in equation (13) on page 10 contends
that a node h ∈ N is contested in network D if its coverage, determined by the nodes it
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intermediates, is a subset of the coverage and the reach of the nodes in Ch ⊂ N \ {h}.
Now consider an intermediary i ∈ MD that is contested by a set of agents, C ⊂ N \ {i}.
Since i is contested, it must be true that all of i’s predecessors can be connected to all
of i’s successors by a path that does not include i. Therefore, i cannot be a middleman.
This implies the assertion that every middleman is uncontested.
Proof of (b): Consider an intermediary h ∈ MD who is uncontested in the network D.
Then h’s coverage is not a subset of the coverage of any set of nodes plus the respective
reach of each of these nodes. This implies that h itself has to rest on at least one path
that no other nodes in the network rest on when h is removed from the network. Hence,
in the network D there exists at least one pair of nodes, say i to j, with h ∈ ∩Wij(D)
and Wij(D−{h}) = ∅. This implies that h is actually a middleman concerning the paths
from i to j.
From Theorem 3.12, all middlemen are uncontested; if a node is contested, then all of its
intermediation functions or coverage can be replaced by the coverage of other nodes. From
this, it is understood that a middleman is an intermediary that has a unique function and
is, in some way, more effective than non-middlemen with respect to their connectivity and
thus coverage in the network.
4 Measuring middleman power
A middleman occupies a critical position in a network since its removal disconnects at least
two or more other nodes in the network and, in the most extreme case, might separate the
network into multiple components. Therefore, it seems logical to ask how we can measure
this power. After examining established measures, we propose a measure of middleman
power based on the disconnections that emerge when a middleman is removed from the
network.
4.1 Middlemen and betweenness centrality
We first examine whether betweenness centrality could be a tool to assess middleman
power. Betweenness centrality was proposed independently by Anthonisse (1971) for edges
and rephrased by Freeman (1977) for nodes in undirected networks. White & Borgatti
(1994) proposed an extension to directed networks.
This measure seems specifically relevant since it explicitly considers the role of a node in
connecting other nodes in the network. It may be expected that the betweenness centrality
score of a node provides an indication of what nodes are middlemen by having a greater
betweenness centrality than non-middlemen in the network.
To define the betweenness centrality measure, let pi(hj) be the number of shortest
paths—or geodesics—from node h to node j. Furthermore, let pii(kj) be the number of
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geodesics that pass through node i. Betweenness centrality is now defined as
BCi(D) =
∑
h,j 6=i : pi(hj)6=0
pii(hj)
pi(hj)
(16)
Equation (16) indicates that a middleman i between nodes h and j would always have
a high betweenness centrality since by Definition 3.1 a middleman is on all paths between
these two nodes. In particular, pii(hj) = pi(hj). However, the formulation of betweenness
centrality BC only considers geodesics. As the next example illustrates, the betweenness
centrality of non-middlemen may even surpass that of middlemen.
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Figure 3: The network D considered in Example 4.1
Example 4.1. Consider the acyclic network D depicted in Figure 3. Here, as indicated in
the graph, M(D) = {4, 5, 6}, while nodes 7 and 8 are contested intermediaries. All middle-
men have the same non-normalised betweenness centrality measures due to their equivalent
positions: BC4(D) = BC5(D) = BC6(D) = 4. However, both contested intermediaries
have larger non-normalised betweenness centrality scores: BC7(D) = BC8(D) = 6.
In the underlying undirected network, U , where all arcs in D are reciprocated, the non-
middlemen still have a higher betweenness centrality than middlemen: BC4(U) = BC5(U) =
BC6(U) = 16.4 and BC7(U) = BC8(U) = 25. Below, Table 2 provides a comparison of
common centrality measures all of which indicate that nodes 7 and 8 are more central,
therefore underrating the nodes with powerful middleman properties. 
The identified deficiency of betweenness centrality to verify and measure the control ex-
ercised by middlemen, highlighted in Figure 3 and Table 2, extends to other less common
centrality measures. Indeed, no standard measure for undirected networks specifically
identifies and highlights middlemen, instead the measures tend to over-inflate the power
and importance of contested intermediaries in networks.
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Node Degree PageRank Betweenness Closeness Bonacich β-Measure
1 1 0.112 0.000 0.360 0.328 0.333
2 1 0.112 0.000 0.360 0.328 0.333
3 1 0.112 0.000 0.360 0.328 0.333
4 3 0.330 0.456 0.474 1.047 1.400
5 3 0.330 0.456 0.474 1.047 1.400
6 3 0.330 0.456 0.474 1.047 1.400
7 4 0.480 0.694 0.692 1.565 2.000
8 4 0.480 0.694 0.692 1.565 2.000
9 2 0.297 0.011 0.474 0.863 0.400
10 2 0.297 0.011 0.474 0.863 0.400
Table 2: Centrality results for the undirected network U
The potential high betweenness centrality of non-middlemen, for example, follows from
the underlying assumptions of the measure. Indeed, only geodesics are counted between
two given nodes, assuming that these geodesic paths have equal weight. The combination
of these assumptions implies that the betweenness centrality measure does not necessarily
measure the “power” of a node in negotiating between two others.
4.2 A middleman power measure
The power or control of a middleman in a network D can be measured by simply counting
the number of node pairs (i, j) ∈ N ×N such that (i, j) is connected in D, while (i, j) is
not connected in D − i. This number is introduced as the brokerage of that middleman.
We introduce a general counting method that identifies the brokerage of an arbitrary
node, rather than just the middlemen in a network. Therefore, this counting method
introduces a way to exactly identify the middlemen in the network in an algorithmic
fashion.
Definition 4.2. Let D be a network on node set N = {1, . . . , n} and let i ∈ N be an
arbitrary node. The brokerage of node i is
bi(D) =
∑
j 6=i
[ #Sj(D)−#Sj(D − i) ]−#Pi(D). (17)
The successor set of a node contains all other nodes that can be reached by a path from
that node. The first part of (17),
∑
j 6=i #Sj(D), counts the total number of successors of
all n nodes except for node i. Hence, it provides an indication of the total connectivity of
the network as a whole except for the connections of node i in D.
Using the same intuition, the second part of (17),
∑
j 6=i #Sj(D− i), refers to the total
connectivity of the network when node i is removed. We remark that
∑
j 6=i #Sj(D) >∑
j 6=i #Sj(D − i) if di(D) > 1, and
∑
j 6=i #Sj(D) =
∑
j 6=i #Sj(D − i) if di(D) = 0.
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Therefore,
∑
j 6=i [ #Sj(D)−#Sj(D − i) ] expresses the net connectivity differential
from the removal of node i from the network D. The net connectivity differential captures
two features: (1) The direct connectivity of node i in terms of its successor and predecessor
set;6 and (2) The lost connectivity to other nodes not including i.
To assess the impact of a middleman, we are only interested in the lost connectivity
caused by its removal from the network. Therefore, we compensate the connectivity dif-
ferential with the upward connectivity of i in the network. Specifically, the predecessor
set of node i has to be removed from the connectivity differential, thus adjusting for the
direct connectivity of node i, resulting in the formulation in (17).
In short, the brokerage of a node counts the number of third-party disconnections that
occur due to the removal of a node; or in other words, counts the number of ij-middleman
sets that a node is a member of.
If bi(D) = 0 then the removal of i from the network makes no change to the network’s
connectivity—compensating for the connectivity of i. Hence, all nodes that are connected
by a path in D can still be connected in D − i. Thus, compensating for their connection
to i in D, the number of successors of all j nodes is the same in D − i as in D.
On the other hand, if bi(D) > 1, there exists at least one pair of connected nodes that
are now not connected in D − i. As a consequence, i must be a middleman.
We normalise the brokerage of a node by calculating the total number of potential opportu-
nities for brokerage in the network. Brokerage—and, therefore, middleman positions—can
only emerge if a pair of nodes are a minimum distance of two or more away from each
other. Intuitively, by calculating the indirect successors of all nodes in the network, the
total number of brokerage opportunities can be derived.
The set of indirect successors of i in D is given by Si(D) \ si(D). Therefore, the
number indirect successors for node i is given by #Si(D) − #si(D). Given this, the
maximal potential brokerage in D is computed as:
B(D) =
∑
i∈N
[#Si(D)−#si(D)] . (18)
Note that B(D) = 0 for certain networks, including the empty and complete networks
on N . This leads to the following definition of a normalised brokerage-based centrality
measure.
Definition 4.3. Let D be a network on node set N . The middleman power measure
for D is the function ν(D) : N → R+ with for every node i ∈ N :
νi(D) =
bi(D)
max{B(D), 1} . (19)
6Indeed, the larger the predecessor and successor sets of node i the larger the differential will be
regardless of whether i is a middleman or not.
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A middleman has a network power of 1 if it brokers all potential opportunities in the
network. This includes nodes at the centre of star networks. The next example explicitly
computes the middleman power measure for an undirected star and a directed cycle.
Example 4.4. For an undirected star network, D?, on node set N = {1, . . . , n}, where
n > 3, it holds that bi(D?) = (n − 1)(n − 2) for the centre node and bj(D?) = 0 for
all other nodes. The potential total brokerage for an undirected star is computed as
B(D?) = (n− 1)(n− 2). Therefore, the middleman power of the centre node is
νi(D
?) =
(n− 1)(n− 2)
(n− 1)(n− 2) = 1. (20)
Next, consider a directed cycle D◦ on node set N . Each node has an in-degree of 1 and
an out-degree of 1, implying that all nodes are intermediaries as well as middlemen. We
now compute that b1(D
◦) = . . . = bn(D◦) =
(n−1)(n−2)
2 . The potential total brokerage is
B(D◦) = n(n− 2), implying νi = n−12n for all i ∈ N where n > 3. 
We derive several properties for the middleman power measure stated in (19).
Theorem 4.5. Let D be a network on node set N = {1, . . . , n}.
(a) For every node i ∈ N : 0 6 νi(D) 6 1.
(b) For every contested intermediary i ∈MD : νi(D) = 0.
(c) For every middleman i ∈M(D) : νi(D) > 0.
Proof. We show the two assertions subsequently.
Proof of (a): We omit a mathematical proof of (a), due to its tedious nature. Instead, we
provide an intuitive, more descriptive reasoning.
A middleman cannot take advantage of more than all brokerage opportunities present in
a network; therefore B′(D) > bi(D), implying νi(D) 6 17.
Furthermore, neither bi(D) < 0 nor B(D) < 0. The minimum brokerage of some node
k is in an empty network where #Sk(D) = #Pk(D) = 0. In that case,
∑
i∈N #Si(D) =∑
i 6=k #Si(D − {k}) since k has no connectivity in the network. Therefore, νi(D) > 0 for
any node i ∈ N .
Proof of (b): Let h ∈ MD be a contested intermediary in the network D. Theorem 3.12
asserts a duality between being a contested intermediary and being a non-middleman.
Definition 3.1 implies that h ∈ MD is not a middleman if there is no pair i, j ∈ N with
i 6= j such that h lies on all paths from i to j in D. Hence, h /∈ ∩Wij(D) for all i, j ∈ N
with i 6= j.
Since h is an intermediary it holds that #Ph(D) > 0, #Sh(D) > 0 as well as
∑
i∈N #Si(D) >
7Only in a network where a middleman rests on all geodesic paths of length two, for example an
undirected star, it holds that B′(D) = bi(D).
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∑
i∈N\{h}#Si(D−h) since the nodes in D−h can obviously not connect to h. Also, since
the connectivity of the network D is not affected by the removal of node h, it holds
that the removal of h only affects the connectivity with h itself. Hence,
∑
i∈N #Si(D) −∑
i∈N\{h}#Si(D − h) = #Sh(D) + #Ph(D). Therefore, bh(D) = 0, implying that
νh(D) = 0.
Proof of (c): Let i ∈ M(D) be a middleman in the network D. Then by Theorem 3.12,
node i is uncontested and, therefore, assertion (b) does not apply to i.
Since i is a middleman, there exist at least two nodes h, j ∈ N \ {i} with h 6= j such that
i is an hj-middleman. Hence, j ∈ Sh(D) and j /∈ Sh(D − i). Furthermore, since i is a
hj-middleman it also holds that j ∈ Pi(D) \ Si(D) and h ∈ Si(D) \ Pi(D). This implies
that
bi(D) + #Pi(D) =
∑
i′ 6=i
[ #Si′(D)−#Si′(D − i) ] >
> #Sj(D)−#Sj(D − i) >
> #Pi(D) + 1.
Hence, bi(D) > 1, showing the assertion.
Theorem 4.5 states that the middleman measure ν(D) : N → [0, 1] indeed only assigns
a non-zero value to the middlemen in D. It ranks the middlemen in D according to the
number of flows that are controlled by each of these middlemen. The higher the middleman
measure of a middleman i ∈ M(D), the more control that middleman exercises in the
network.
Bloch et al. (2016) show that, although prominent centrality measures in network
analysis make use of different information about each node’s position in the network,
these measures all originate from a common set of principles that are characterised by the
same simple axioms. In particular, these standard measures are all based on a monotonic
and additively separable treatment of a network statistic that captures a node’s position
in the network.
Our middleman measure is not subject to the analysis introduced by Bloch et al.
(2016), since it is not founded on any of the network statistics identified there. It forms
a truly alternative way to assess the importance of a node in a network. Applications
show that the middleman measure indeed identifies nodes with the highest impact on the
functionality of the network. (See also Section 5 of this paper.)
4.3 The robustness of middlemen in networks
The control that middlemen exert in a network can be affected by deliberate actions of
other parties in that network. Indeed, other nodes can create new relationships in the
network and sever arcs to counter the power and control exerted by a middleman. This
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refers to a dynamic element, represented as a modification of the architecture or topology
of the network to render a middleman to a non-middleman position. Therefore, a more
robust middleman position is less susceptible to a change in the topological structure of
the network.
We refer to the number of changes required in the network to render a middleman
powerless as the robustness of that middleman. We perceive middleman robustness to
infer how a given middleman can maintain an exploitive position given a change to the
topological structure of the network from the addition or deletion of arcs.
We introduce three methods in which to measure middleman robustness: The first
two measures relate the robustness of a node’s exploitive position given the deletion and
addition of arcs; The third method measures middleman robustness given the removal of
all arcs from and to a certain set of nodes from the initial network. We consider the first
arc robustness measure as the most essential one, referring to it as the “robustness” of a
middleman.
Arc robustness. The arc-robustness—or simply robustness—of a middleman in a net-
work is defined as the minimum number of arcs that have to be added to the network in
order for a middleman to be rendered inessential for maintaining all flows in the network.
The dual formulation of robustness—denoted as dual robustness—measures the mini-
mum number of arcs that have to be removed from the network such that a given middle-
man loses its brokerage function and power.
Definition 4.6. Let D be some network on node set N = {1, . . . , n} such that M(D) 6= ∅.
Furthermore, let i ∈M(D) be a middleman in D.
(a) The robustness of middleman i is given by
ρi(D) = min
{
#D′ | D ⊂ D′ and i /∈M(D′)}−#D (21)
(b) The dual robustness of middleman i is given by
ρ?i (D) = #D −max
{
#D′ | D′ ⊂ D and i /∈M(D′)} (22)
Obviously, the cardinality of D is equal to the number of arcs in the network. The arc-
robustness of a middleman is defined as the minimum number of arcs that need to be
added to the initial network D in order for a middleman to be completely circumvented
and subsequently lose its position as a middleman. The dual-robustness measure is equal
to the minimum number of arcs that need to be removed from the initial network D
such that a given middleman no longer has an exploitive position in the resulting network
D′ ⊂ D.
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If a node is a middleman then the value of both its arc-robustness and its dual-
robustness will always be a positive integer. However, neither of these robustness measures
will necessarily be correlated with the middleman’s brokerage measure; there exist situa-
tions in which a middleman’s brokerage can be increased by extending the network beyond
that middleman, while keeping the middleman’s robustness and dual-robustness constant.
An alternative interpretation of the robustness of a middleman is how easily this mid-
dleman can become contested by a coalition of other nodes. A low value for its robustness
ρi implies that it takes relatively few new relationships to make that middleman, i, con-
testable.
The following result gives bounds on these two arc robustness measures for an arbitrary
middleman.
Proposition 4.7. Let D be a network on the node set N and let i ∈M(D) be a middleman
in D. Then it holds that
1 6 ρi(D) 6 min {bi(D), d+i + d−i − 1} (23)
1 6 ρ?i (D) 6 min {d+i , d−i } (24)
The lower bounds stated in Proposition 4.7 are obvious. Indeed, a middleman is critical for
the connection for at least one pair of nodes. So, robustness requires the introduction of at
least one new arc to connect such a pair. Similarly, dual robustness requires the removal
of at least one arc to make a middleman obsolete. This lower bound is attained for
both robustness measures in a circular directed network in which all nodes are middlemen
and each node can be circumvented by an arc from its direct predecessor to its direct
successor—or by the removal of the single incoming or outgoing arc of that middleman.
The proof of the stated upper bound for the robustness measure ρ in Proposition 4.7 is
based on some simple insights. First, it should be clear that in every network, by linking
the node pairs that are counted in the brokerage measure bi of some middleman, one
indeed circumvents that middleman completely. So, the robustness of a middleman never
exceeds the number of pairs that are counted in the brokerage of that middleman.
Furthermore, the example also shows that the second identified upper bound d+i +d
−
i −1
is attained exactly in a star network. The methodology of circumventing a middleman as
constructed in the example, applies in general to any middleman in any network, thus
showing that this upper bound indeed applies generally.
Finally, the upper bound for the dual robustness measure is identified from the next
example as well. Indeed, in a star network either all incoming arcs or all outgoing arcs
need to be removed to make a middleman a source or a sink in the resulting modified
network. This methodology again applies generally to any middleman in any network,
thus providing an upper bound. As shown in the example, this upper bound is attained
in a star network.
20
12
C
3
4
5
Figure 4: A star network D in Example 4.8.
Example 4.8. Consider the network D depicted in Figure 4 on the node set N =
{1, . . . , 5, C}. Clearly, M(D) = {C} is the unique middleman in this network with degrees
d−C = 2 and d
+
C = 3. The brokerage of this middleman is determined as bC(D) = d
−
C · d+C =
2 · 3 = 6.
The middleman C can be rendered powerless by introducing a minimum of 4 new arcs
into the network D to form network D′, depicted in Figure 5. This shows that, indeed,
the robustness of middleman C in the network D is exactly the indicated upper bound in
Proposition 4.7: ρC(D) = d
−
C+d
+
C−1 = 4, which is based on the length of the semi-circular
path around the middleman C to connect the direct predecessors and direct successors of
C.
Finally, we also note that middleman C in network D can be rendered powerless by mak-
ing C a source by removing the arcs from nodes 1 and 2 to C. This indeed shows that in
a star network the dual robustness of the middleman C is indeed equal to the indicated
upper bound in Proposition 4.7: ρ?C(D) = min {d+C , d−C} = min{2, 3} = 2. 
Node robustness. The node-robustness of a middleman is an extension of the dual
(arc) robustness measure. The node-robustness of a middleman is defined in terms of the
minimum number of nodes that need to be deleted from the network in order for a given
node to lose its middleman position. The removal of a node i ∈ N from network D is
equivalent to the deletion of all arcs to its direct neighbours, j ∈ si(D) ∪ pi(D).
Definition 4.9. Let D be a network on node set N such that M(D) 6= ∅. Furthermore,
let i ∈M(D) be a middleman in D. The node–robustness of middleman i is now given
as
ψi(D) = min {#C | C ⊂ N \ {i} such that i /∈M(D − C) } (25)
where D−C = {ij ∈ D | i, j ∈ N \C } is the network resulting from D through the removal
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Figure 5: The modified star network D′ in Example 4.8.
of the node set C.
It can easily be checked that the node-robustness of a middleman is at most its dual
robustness. Indeed, every arc that is deleted to render the middleman powerless, can be
replaced by the removal of the originating node of each removed arc.
Proposition 4.10. Let D be a network on the node set N and let i ∈M(D) be a middle-
man in D. Then it holds that
1 6 ψi(D) 6 ρ?i (D) 6 min {d+i , d−i }. (26)
The identified bounds in Proposition 4.10 can be illustrated with a simple line network
consisting of three nodes, illustrated in Figure 6 below, in which the middleman’s node
robustness is strictly lower than its dual robustness.
In Figure 6, node 2 is the unique middleman, while nodes 1 and 3 are leaf nodes. The
removal of a single arc retains 2’s middleman position. Therefore, ρ?2 = 2 = d
+
2 = d
−
2 . On
the other hand, the node robustness of node 2 is determined by the fact that the removal
of either node 1 or node 3 is sufficient to render node 2 no longer being a middleman.
Hence, ψ2 = 1 < ρ
?
2.
1 2 3
Figure 6: The difference between node robustness and dual link robustness
Furthermore, we point out that there are numerous networks in which the upper bound
identified in Proposition 4.10 is tight. Indeed, in the star network depicted in Figure
4, the middleman C has equal dual link robustness and node robustness: ψC = ρ
?
C =
min{d+C , d−C} = 2.
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5 An application to two empirical networks
We apply our middleman power and robustness measures to two well-known social net-
works. From the assessment of these networks we provide a discussion regarding the
potential of middlemen in these networks. The results of middleman power are compared
with other measures of centrality. This is done in terms of reference; we refrain from
correlating the results of these measures because we showed above that middleman power
measures different aspects of a node than other measures.
5.1 Middlemen in Krackhardt’s advice network
Figure 7: Krackhardt’s network of advice among managers
We consider the well-known organisational advice network seminally investigated by
Krackhardt (1987). Krackhardt investigated the relationships between managers in a
middle-size firm,8 consisting of 21 managers. He collected information from the managers
about who sought advice from whom, depicted in Figure 7. An arc from i to j denotes
that manager i has sought advice from manager j; therefore, an arc from j to i denotes
that manager j has provided advice to manager i. In this depiction the size of the node
reflects its in-degree.
Middlemen are important for this particular network for a number of intuitive reasons:
First, a middleman can block ideas, advice, and information from being transmitted from
one group of managers to another. Second, a middleman can manipulate the information
8We use data in the “LAS” matrix from p. 129 in the Krackhardt article as it seems to be the most
objective measure.
23
transferred from one group of managers to another.
Manager d−i d
+
i Ei BCi νi
1 12 4 0.068 0.035 0.000
2 18 2 0.306 0.011 0.000
3 3 9 1.271 0.018 0.000
4* 6 7 1.001 0.071 0.090
5 3 10 1.463 0.009 0.000
6 0 1 0.172 0.000 0.000
7 11 6 0.776 0.048 0.000
8 1 7 1.013 0.001 0.000
9 4 9 1.171 0.011 0.000
10 8 5 0.820 0.018 0.000
11 9 3 0.344 0.004 0.000
12 3 1 0.172 0.000 0.000
13 0 6 0.938 0.000 0.000
14 10 4 0.625 0.002 0.000
15* 3 9 1.265 0.092 0.161
16 0 4 0.580 0.000 0.000
17 0 5 0.673 0.000 0.000
18 15 12 1.745 0.231 0.000
19 2 10 1.493 0.002 0.000
20 6 7 1.028 0.028 0.000
21** 15 8 1.348 0.176 0.147
Table 3: Influence, centrality, and middlemen in Krackhardt’s advice network
Table 3 reports the characteristics of this network. Here, we report the in- and out-
degrees; the Bonacich centrality index E (Bonacich 1972, 1987); the betweenness centrality
BC; and the middleman power measuree ν. Furthermore, a single star (*) indicates a
regular middleman and a double star (**) indicates a strong middleman. We identify two
regular middlemen, managers 4 and 15, and one strong middleman, manager 21.
Middleman 15 has the highest middleman power in the organisation, controlling a total
of 34 relationships. This is also reflected in that Krackhardt (1987) highlighted manager
15 as an important agent in the organisational advice network. However, Node 15 does
not have the highest betweenness or Bonacich centralities. Instead, Node 18 is the most
prominent in terms of Bonacich and betweenness scores, although not being a middleman
in the network.9
The reported Bonacich and betweenness centrality measures for the Krackhardt net-
work confirm that both seem to be poor indicators for ranking middlemen: Node 15 is the
most powerful middleman in the network, but has a Bonacich and betweenness centrality
lower than Node 21. The Bonacich influence model does not consider the fact that mid-
9The high betweenness and Bonacich centality measures might be a function of the in- and out-degree
of Node 18.
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dlemen are potentially able to exploit their position by using information from others and
blocking the transmission of certain information and ideas.
5.2 The elite Florentine marriage network
The marriage network of elite houses in renaissance Florence has been used extensively
to assess the effectiveness of many centrality measures to highlight positions of impor-
tance and influence (Newman 2005). It has been shown in contemporary studies of this
network that the Medici house had the highest centrality across a number of measures
(Jackson 2008, Chapter 2). However, de Roover (1963), Padgett (1994), and Goldthwaite
(2009) explain that their prominence in the marriage network is derived from their ability
to access diverse sources of information within the Florentine aristocracy. As such, the
Medici family filter information by choosing to allow or disallow information to spread
between factions; thus largely monopolising inter-factional informational spread. Powerful
brokerage opportunities, which the Medici took advantage of, emerged due to the inherent
“network disjunctures within the elite” (Padgett & Ansell 1993, p. 1259). In particular,
Padgett & Ansell (1993) show that Cosimo de’Medici was able to gain access to, and
control of, the flow of diverse information between opposing political factions and also
between houses in the same faction. Within our context, its middleman position allowed
the Medici family to attain power within Florentine society; especially, the Medici’s ability
to act as broker between a large number of houses crossing opposing political factions.
Keeping with the format and structure initially provided by Padgett & Ansell (1993,
p. 1276–77)—but unlike more recent renditions of the Florentine marriage network that are
presented in terms of an undirected graph—we represent this network as a directed graph.
An arc drawn from house i to house j illustrates a female from house or family i married
to a male in house j. The resulting marriage network is depicted in Figure 8.10 Infor-
mation flowed through these relationships, and marriages have often supported economic
relationships in the form of trade, employment and loan provision (Kent 2009).
Unlike more recent assessments of the Florentine marriage network we include houses
as group of families; thus all nodes in the network represent a group of families under the
same name. These houses are coloured depending on the factions that the houses were
affiliated: light grey nodes are houses affiliated with the Medician faction and dark grey
nodes are houses affiliated with the opposing Oligarch faction.
Network structure. There are 32 houses in this network: 11 houses in the Medician
faction and 21 houses in the oligarchic faction. As depicted, the marriage network consists
of 9 weakly connected components. The giant weakly connected component contains 62.5%
of all houses in the analysis. The network diameter is 6 with an average path length of
10The data was initially gathered by Kent (1978) and a block model network was constructed and used
in Padgett & Ansell (1993) and Padgett (1994). The network provided in Figure 8 is directly derived from
these studies. Both provide a rich analysis of the houses in Florence at this time.
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Figure 8: Directed network of Florentine marriages (c. 1434)
2.881 and the directed network density is 0.031. The degree distribution is similar to that
of a power law. The maximal k-core is 4 and consists of the Pazzi, Peruzzi, Strozzi, and
Albizzi houses.
The network produced in Figure 8 highlights a clear distinction between the connec-
tivity of the two main factions. Only 3 out of 31 reported marriages were between houses
in different factions. As such, it is clear that the Pazzi, Albizzi and Medici houses act as
gate-keepers of the main information flows between the factions within the giant compo-
nent. Each of these three houses acts as strong middlemen; however, the Medici is the
only house that acts as a strong middleman between both factions. Indeed, the removal of
the Medici leads to the partitioning of the factions in the giant component: The removal
of either the Pazzi and Albizzi families does not have the same effect.
Centrality and power. We analyse the marriage network using in-degree (d−), out-
degree (d+), Bonacich (1987) eigenvector centrality (E), betweenness centrality (BC),
26
House d+i d
−
i BCi Ei νi
Albizzi** 3 3 0.066 0.701 0.357
Castellani** 3 1 0.034 0.310 0.187
Ginori** 1 2 0.014 0.257 0.076
Guadagni** 1 1 0.001 0.001 0.006
Medici** 3 2 0.058 0.506 0.269
Pazzi** 3 4 0.093 1.000 0.503
Peruzzi* 4 2 0.070 0.612 0.287
Rondinelli* 1 1 0.014 0.157 0.076
Strozzi** 3 2 0.053 0.506 0.152
Table 4: Middlemen in the directed Florentine marriage network
and the normalised middleman power (ν) of each house. The results of the analysis on
middlemen is presented in Table 4. A full analysis of the centrality measures of all 32
houses in the network can be found in the table in the appendix to this paper.
The simplest measurement of node centrality is the the number of direct successors—
represented by the out-degree (d+i )—and the number of direct predecessors—represented
by the in-degree (d−i )—of a node. The Peruzzi has the greatest number of direct successors
(4) and the Pazzi have the greatest number of direct predecessors (4); the Pazzi also have
the greatest sum of direct successors and direct predecessors (7).11
If the network were represented as an undirected network, the Pazzi, Albizzi, and
Peruzzi are connected to 6 houses each. The Medici and Strozzi are connected to 5
houses each. There are two aspects to note from the assessment of node degree. First
we note that, in general, families with a relatively higher degree are more prone to be
middlemen in the network. This is true for most families, apart from the Guadagni who
are conveniently positioned such that their single in-degree and single out-degree forms a
middleman position. Second, we note that the Medici faction does not have the highest
degree centrality relative to other families in the Oligarchic faction.
The Pazzi possesses the highest betweenness centrality in the directed network. The
measure can favour middlemen thus typically ranking them higher; eight of the top ten
houses in terms of their betweenness score BC are either weak or strong middlemen. The
Medici have the highest betweenness centrality (0.166) followed by the Pazzi (0.142). Un-
surprisingly, the Bonacich centrality measure ranks the Pazzi highly, but also ranks many
non-middlemen highly; specifically the Panciatichi house. From the network topology
alone there is no indication to suggest that the Panciatichi should have had a prominent
role in the Florentine aristocracy. Although the Medici rank highly with this measure, the
relevance of an eigenvector centrality measure is questionable: there is no real reason to
11In an undirected network the connections that a node has is given by the total number of connections
that a node has; this is not necessarily the same as the sum of direct predecessors and direct successors as
some node may be both a direct predecessor and direct successor.
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Directed Undirected
House ρi ρ
?
i ψi ρi ρ
?
i ψi
Albizzi** 4 3 3 1 1 1
Castellani** 3 3 3 2 2 2
Ginori** 2 1 1 2 2 2
Guadagni** 1 1 1 1 1 1
Medici** 4 2 2 3 3 3
Pazzi** 6 3 3 1 1 1
Peruzzi* 2 2 2 0 0 0
Rondinelli* 1 1 1 0 0 0
Strozzi** 4 2 2 2 2 2
Table 5: Robustness of middlemen in the Florentine marriage network
believe why the importance of a house would come from its degree and the degree of its
neighbours alone.
Assessing the marriage network with the middleman power measure highlights the
Medici family as a strong middleman, along with the prominent Albizzi, Castellani, Ginori,
Pazzi, and Strozzi houses. It is, however, the Pazzi and Albizzi that have a greater
middleman power measure (0.503 and 0.357 respectively) than the Medici (0.269). The
diversity of the Medici’s brokered relationships extend further than those of the Albizzi
and Pazzi as the Medici brokers between factions. If, however, the directed marriage
network were converted into an undirected network such that information can flow in
both directions, then the Medici becomes the most powerful middleman with a normalised
middleman power of 0.470; they are followed by the Ginori, Castellani and Strozzi families
who have a normalised middleman power of 0.213.
Middleman robustness. The robustness of each middleman position is measured in
terms of the ρi-robustness, (dual) ρ
?
i -robustness, and node ψi-robustness measures, re-
ported in Table 5. In general we find that the ρ?i - and ψi-robustness measures provide
identical results. The directed network highlights the Albizzi, Pazzi, and Medici as being
robust; especially in terms of the ρi-robustness measure. The results also suggests that
there is a clear distinction between the consistency of some middlemen over others. The
Medici is highlighted as being the most robust strong middleman in the undirected net-
work. Notably, even though the Pazzi and Albizzi were robust in the directed network they
both perform poorly in terms of the undirected representation of the marriage network.
Centrality and robustness measures are purely topological and do not highlight the hetero-
geneous factions that exist within this network and the importance of information broker-
age between them. Therefore they assume that relationships can be created and severed
without social or institutional pressures. As a consequence it could be argued that, regard-
less of these robustness measures, the Medici has the highest middleman robustness due
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to the fact that they are weak and strong middlemen across both factions. Indeed, social
and marriage relationships cannot be formed so seamlessly between families of opposing
factions, therefore the robustness of the Medici’s position is further strengthened due to
the societal environment.
6 Concluding remarks
Middlemen possess the ability to connect pairs of nodes who would otherwise be discon-
nected; this can have liberating externalities for those directly or indirectly connected to
middlemen in the form of opening new exchange routes and channels of information. On
the other hand, middlemen can exploit their position and, as such, extract positional rents.
Whether a middleman behaves in an exploitative or facilitative is ambiguous and depends
on the institutional governance of activities in the network.
Our middleman power measure provides a tool that measures the positional power
of the middleman and, therefore, is an objective quantifier of the extractive and value-
generating abilities of the middleman. We also note that the middleman power measure
should not be considered as a replacement for other centrality measures. It is itself not just
a measure of centrality; rather it identifies a certain type of node in a network and measures
brokerage. The measure should be complimented with other measures of centrality.
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Appendix: Centrality in the Florentine network c. 1434
House Faction d+i d
−
i BCi Ei νi
Albizzi** Oligarch 3 3 0.066 0.701 0.357
Aldobrandini Oligarch 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.000
Altoviti Oligarch 0 1 0.000 0.355 0.000
Baroncelli Oligarch 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.000
Benizzi Oligarch 1 0 0.000 0.000 0.000
Bisheri Oligarch 0 1 0.000 0.002 0.000
Castellani** Oligarch 3 1 0.034 0.310 0.187
C-Donati Medician 0 1 0.000 0.001 0.000
Da Uzzano Oligarch 1 1 0.000 0.506 0.000
Dall’Antella Medician 1 0 0.000 0.000 0.000
Davanzati Medician 1 0 0.000 0.000 0.000
Della Casa Oligarch 1 1 0.001 0.309 0.000
Dietisalvi Medician 0 1 0.000 0.132 0.000
Fioravanti Medician 1 0 0.000 0.000 0.000
Ginori(**) Medician 1 2 0.014 0.257 0.076
Guadagni** Oligarch 1 1 0.001 0.001 0.006
Guicciardini Medician 1 0 0.000 0.000 0.000
Lamberteschi Oligarch 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.000
Medici** Medician 3 2 0.058 0.506 0.269
Orlandini Medician 0 1 0.000 0.001 0.000
Panciatichi Oligarch 1 2 0.005 0.566 0.000
Pazzi** Oligarch 3 4 0.093 1.000 0.503
Pepi Oligarch 0 1 0.000 0.157 0.000
Peruzzi* Oligarch 4 2 0.070 0.612 0.287
Rondinelli* Oligarch 1 1 0.014 0.157 0.076
Rucellai Oligarch 0 1 0.000 0.256 0.000
Scambrilla Oligarch 0 1 0.000 0.157 0.000
Solosmei Oligarch 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.000
Strozzi** Oligarch 3 2 0.053 0.506 0.152
Tornabuoni Medician 0 1 0.000 0.257 0.000
Valori Medician 1 0 0.000 0.000 0.000
Velluti Oligarch 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.000
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